~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

2 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL STEWART

SUBJECT: Comments on Task Group Report on Alternative
Management Arrangements for New Photographic
Search and Surveillance System

1. The whole thrust of this paper emphasizes "main-
tain organizational identity and responsibility and fully
utilize overall organizational assets" rather than addressing
the major problem--the managing of the development of the
new system. This preoccupation with organization position
cannot contribute anything but increased problems to the
development of the new system.

2. Perhaps one should, before commenting on the various
alternatives, examine in some detail the "overall organi-
zational assets of both organizations"--I know the assets
of SAFSP--management experience in systems, numerous capable
officers with camera development experience, numerous con-
tracting officers with R&D contracting experience. What
resources and experience does CIA-OSP have? Will a listing
of these assets be long or short? Perhaps all of these
alternatives should be submitted to SAFSP and CIA-OSP as
RFP's. Let them come back with proposals on people and
their experience who will man the offices.

3. The timely development of the system is a big
enough technical problem to absorb all the energies of the
SPD and his office without adding the unnecessary compli-
cation of individuals or agencies "maintaining an organi-
zational (institutional) position." Without total dedication
by the entire program office to the successful development
of the system the program will fail.

4. An observation--regardless of the management scheme
selected there will eventually be one strong man who in
reality becomes the program director or the program will
fail.

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5. The key question in judging the various alternatives has to be "who can make and enforce decisions on critical matters." From the various alternatives proposed one can answer this question for a number of functions which must be performed in the SPO.

TABLE 1

MGT FUNCTIONS	DECISION MAKER			
	NRO SPD	FULLY INTEGRATED SPO	COSPD	SEGREGATED SPO
SYSTEM ENGINEERING	NRO	SPD	DNRO	DNRO* (SPD)
SYSTEM INTEGRATION	NRO	SPD	DNRO	SPD
INTERFACE DEFINITION	NRO	SPD	DNRO	DNRO**
INTERFACE REVISION (A CONTINUING TASK)	NRO	SPD	DNRO	DNRO**
SYSTEM SPECIFICATION (A CONTINUING TASK)	NRO	SPD	DNRO	DNRO**
BUDGET	NRO	SPD	DNRO	DNRO**
SCHEDULES	NRO	SPD	DNRO	DNRO**
TECHNICAL TRADEOFFS (DAILY TASKS)	NRO	SPD	DNRO	DNRO**
WT ALLOCATIONS TESTING CONSIDERATIONS POWER REQTS & ALLOCATIONS ENVIRONMENT SPEC STABILITY REQT'S. TELEMETRY ALLOCATIONS & REQT'S. COMMAND A&R SMEAR BUDGET	NRO	SPD	DNRO	DNRO**
TEST PHILOSOPHY	NRO	SPD	DNRO	DNRO**

*Document says SPD will assign to one of the organization

**Document says team effort of SPD, DSPD, and APD but does not specify who makes and enforces decisions. Further statement is made "....organization not possessing the SPD becomes responsible both to the DNRO and the other organization."

~~SECRET~~ 2

Interface definitions are iterative, not static, documents. The SPO is engaged daily in interface decisions. These decisions must be made promptly based on complete knowledge and thorough understanding of consequences. Penalty for indecision--fait accompli by contractors and/or schedule slips.

     5. I will comment in more detail only on the Fully Integrated ,CO-SPD ,and Segregated SPO alternatives.

        a. Fully Integrated SPO - The only logical choice if one really wants to get this system built. The CIA can be assigned responsibility for the camera sensor by the SPD. The CIA people are a part of the SPO and report to the SPD. Similar arrangements are recognized in other documents on systems management.

> "Representatives of participating organizations, as members of the SPO team, are directed by the SPD, even though they are not in the same chain of command. The "team" represents organizational capabilities, together with resources, made available throughout the functional structure...."

To my mind a refusal or reluctance to organize in this manner indicates that there is a greater interest in pursuing organizational aims than in pursuing an FOSS development program. Or stated more bluntly "If we can't build the camera on our terms then there ain't gonna be no new system."

        b. CO-SPD. Once upon a time there was a program named "ADVENT"--a military communications satellite involving the Air Force and the Army. The Air Force wanted to have complete control of milcomsat and build the entire system-- satellite, satellite borne comm gear, and grd stations. So did the Army.

        A compromise was developed--Air Force would build the satellite, Army would build the satellite payload and the grd stations. This killed the program.

        c. The segregated SPO - A committee to resolve the day to day problems in the development of the system.

SECRET Handle via BYEMAN Control System

~~SECRET~~

The SPD has no real authority over the APD since the latter works at home in the environment of his organization.

The only essential difference between this and the CO-SPD is that the SPD and DNRO are both frustrated and get ulcers whereas in the CO-SPD it is only the DNRO who suffers.

6. Contractors will spend the first year jockeying for position (divided government responsibility will cause government agencies to do the same and will exacerbate the situation exponentially). The government serves as referee in interface disputes between the contractors. Who referees between the government agencies?

FRANK S. BUZARD
Colonel, USAF

~~SECRET~~