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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

2 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WORTHMAN

SUBJECT: TASK GROUP REPORT; COMMENTS ON

In reply to your request of 29 October 1965, I have reviewed the subject document. My comments generally follow the text, commencing with Section III. (Management Approaches).

a. Overall System Responsibilities in the NRO

At first look, such a proposal is the direct antithesis of my understanding of the functional role of a staff. However, from its inception, the NRO Staff was not intended to conform to the normal staff functions, although it has been vigorously aimed in that direction in the recent past. With realignment of management philosophy and a removal of handcuffs, this approach may be the only saving grace for the deep trouble FOSS finds itself in due to the NRP Agreement and due to an overly-developed desire to "preserve the identity" of the contributory agencies.

b. Fully Integrated System Project Office

I think it is essential that a single, responsible System Project Director (SPD) be designated under this or any other NRP Program; however, I do not agree that a "Deputy System Project Director (DSPD)" from the "other side" is a necessity, or is even really desirable. In my opinion the second-in-command should perform Executive Officer or Chief of Staff functions. In any case, his selection and his functional employment should be at the discretion of the SPD (assuming there is one).

Ample proof exists that this management technique is the best way to manage a military system project and my intuitive feeling is that it might even work middling well if the CIA-OSP were designated the responsible agency.

c. Co-system Project Directors

This system might produce something if Damon and Pythias were co-directors; if it were to be a short program (preferably

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under 10 days); if we could dispense with the "collective authority" philosophy; and if we had a full-time DNRO, and/or an NRO Staff whose responsibilities and authorities in these areas were clear. Having none of the above, such a system would act to preserve identities but little aplomb. Here, I think Santayana's definition of a fanatic would apply - "one who redoubles his efforts while losing sight of his aims." Much of the NRO Staff's and DNRO's time would be expended in refereeing a continuous wrestling match. In view of the fact that single managership decisions must be made throughout such an arrangement, why not make the hard decision at the beginning?

d. The Segregated System Project Office


No amount of shell-gaming is going to correct the fact that a program needs a hard-nosed Director and a tiger ~~in~~ an Exec. plus a method whereby this pair can achieve support and response from the associated agencies. The management method proposed herein appears to be a mask of confusion.

With respect to split responsibilities, it is apparent that FOSS is going to have to be played with a rigged deck, therefore CIA will become responsible for the Sensor Module with or without the Recovery Module. This is the simplest management decision of all.

At this juncture I should like to note that throughout this document (and the Annex to the NRP Agreement) I note a recurring imprimatur which reflects a CIA-possessed expertise in optical sensor systems which may be more illusion than fact. Why has this never been questioned?

In summation:

- a. Single integrated program management for FOSS is essential.
- b. Definition of a realigned NRO Staff responsibility and authority is highly desirable.
- c. The document requires severe pruning.

  
ROBERT A. KOCH  
Captain, USN

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