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Handle via BYEMA
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COMOR-D-56/13
(Revised)

6 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Project STOPPER

        Attached is a brief description of the current status
of Project STOPPER as provided by ██████ of CIA.   It is
distributed for information and reference of COMOR.   ██████
was requested to advise the COMOR from time to time of develop-
ments in this project of interest to the Committee.

        James Q. Reber
        Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment:
  Subject paper

Copies 2, 3   State TCO
            4   DIA(Col. Ainsworth)
  5, 6, 7, 8   DIA TCO
            9   OACSI TCO
     10, 11   ONI TCO
     12- 15   AFNIN TCO
     16, 17   NSA TCO
     18, 19   NRO TCO

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      should be destroyed inasmuch as the security handling was
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Project STOPPER

1.   Project STOPPER is a simple and inexpensive electronic device installed in the DISCOVERER satellite series. To date there have been 2 STOPPER flights and others will be programmed. STOPPER's primary purpose is the collection of so-called vulnerability data on DISCOVERER satellites.   To test the vulnerability of the satellite, STOPPER is programmed to:

      a.   Intercept Soviet attempts to interrogate or otherwise sensitize the satellite's command channel, and

      b.   Detect Soviet attempts to track the satellite.

STOPPER has a secondary ELINT capability for signal pickup on 3 bands from 100 - 2500 mc.   The first and second flights may possibly have picked up signals in the 1000 - 2500 mc band during several passes over the USSR, including, on the second flight, a 300 - mile line of sight fly-by over Sary Shagan.

2.   The system has some limitations as follows:

      a.   Noise problems (e. g., satellite cameras) can cause erroneous ELINT intercepts by STOPPER.

      b.   STOPPER's band discrimination is not too good.

      c.   At present any STOPPER pick up should be treated only as an indicator for correlation with other available data for later operational planning purposes.

3.   The organization for analysis and interpretation of STOPPER's "take" (both vulnerability data and ELINT) is not set at present.   Lockheed is now doing the readout.   Copies of this report are going to SAFSP (Secretary, Air Force Special Projects) in El Segundo.   This reporting is then transmitted to NRO and thence to CIA.   It is planned to establish a data transmittal link between Lockheed and CIA for "quick" readouts of STOPPER missions. Copies of this type report would also be transmitted to DIA, SAFSP, and NRO.

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