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*Com. Mr. Gen*

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COMOR-D-65/2

18 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance  
SUBJECT: Interim COMOR Guidance Re Satellite  
SIGINT Target Objectives and R&D Needs

At its 14 March meeting COMOR approved the attached paper with the request that the Chairman now forward it to the NRO. Tab C was added by the Chairman at the request of the Committee. (See COMOR-M-151, para 3.)



*James Q. Reber*  
James Q. Reber  
Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

- Copies 23, State TCO
- 4 DIA (Col. Ainsworth)
- 5, 6, 7, 8 DIA TCO
- 9 OACSI TCO
- 10, 11 ONI TCO
- 12, 13 AFNIN TCO
- 14, 15 NSA TCO
- 16, 17 NRO TCO

BYE-2150-63  
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[Redacted]

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GROUP 1  
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Tab A

COMOR-D-65/2

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, NRO Staff

SUBJECT: Interim COMOR Guidance Re Satellite  
SIGINT Target Objectives and R&D Needs

1. As no doubt your representative on COMOR, Colonel Duncan, may have advised you, COMOR is in the process of revising and updating the United States Intelligence Board statement of requirements for satellite collection (USIB-D-33.6/8, 5 July 1960).
2. Meanwhile, the COMOR's Target Working Group has developed a procedure for providing detailed target guidance to the collector and is well along in the actual preparation of the card file which will serve both as a means of transmitting specific guidance to the collector and to those responsible for processing the materials. As new information is received, these cards will be updated and new cards issued. The card deck, which is attached at Tab A is for your information and use as appropriate, has already been made available to the participating agencies in COMOR.
3. In the course of its work as indicated above and taking into account the satellite SIGINT requirements paper which is preliminarily considered satisfactory in COMOR, the Target Working

2

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Tab A

COMOR-D-65/2

Group has evolved suggestions which the NRO may well find useful in its ongoing management of current Satellite SIGINT packages. These suggestions have been reviewed by COMOR and the Committee feels that they should be forwarded to you as useful feedback from the consumer. It is surmised that, for the most part, these suggestions would involve modifications at small cost. COMOR would appreciate your comments both on the card file and the suggestions in Tab B.

James Q. Reber  
Chairman  
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachments:

1. Tab A- Target Cards(not attached except to NRO. Cards have been distributed separately to COMOR participants)
2. Tab B- Comment on Currently Planned Missions for Satellite SIGINT Collection
3. Tab C- Tentative Satellite SIGINT Launch Program (March 1963 - March 1964)

3

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Tab B

COMOR-D-65/2

Comment on Currently Planned Missions for Satellite SIGINT  
Collection

1. The current schedule adheres quite closely to the priorities, concepts, and periodicity of coverage outlined in the attachments. However, the following additional specific comments are applicable.

a. The desired periodicity of General Search and ROB obviously cannot be entirely met. However, the distribution of DYNO and [REDACTED] payloads versus Directed Coverage is considered to be adequately balanced.

b. The allocation of frequency bands for ROB [REDACTED] are generally in accordance with the established priority objectives. However, further emphasis should be given to objectives in the frequency spectrums of 650 - 800 mcs and 4900 - 5100 mcs.

c. No information was available on the frequency bands assigned to General Search [REDACTED]. However, the frequencies assigned to [REDACTED] do not provide for possible intercept of the 155 - 165 mcs suspected ABM associated radar listed as Entity Serial (B-13) in the card file attached. We recommend that frequency spectrum

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Tab B

COMOR-D-65/2

be covered. Additionally, in view of the malfunctioning of [REDACTED] those frequencies of primary interest assigned thereto should be considered for follow-up by one of the scheduled General Search missions. Specific determination of frequencies to be assigned should await further evaluation of [REDACTED] (including the impact of recently developed procedures to reduce intermodulation) and the production of additional intelligence.

d. The [REDACTED] series of missions appears to be overemphasized, inasmuch as no current requirement exists for such stringent ROB accuracy location. We assume, therefore, that the [REDACTED] series is mainly for R&D test purposes, although as noted in para b above, the frequency spectrum of 4900 - 5100 mcs has not been adequately programmed under the ROB concept [REDACTED]. It is recommended that if the initial [REDACTED] package is successful in all its objectives, consideration be given to reducing further missions of this type and transferring the spectrum coverage to an ROB package such as [REDACTED].

5

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Tab B

COMOR-D-65/2

e. The highest priority COMINT signal for ESV collection, in our opinion, is the [REDACTED] which is suspected to be a major command link among the Soviet Rocket Forces. The technical problems associated with obtaining full bandwidth coverage are formidable and will require considerable R/D. However, it might be possible to launch some packages during the next year's programmed schedule if other missions such as [REDACTED] were reduced.

f. It is recommended that a RED VINO mission be programmed if at all possible because (1) it is designed to collect the [REDACTED] signal [REDACTED] in our opinion the 2d highest priority COMINT objective for ESV collection, (2) no successful results have been produced thus far, and (3) one remaining package exists for which no booster is assigned.

g. It is believed that the [REDACTED] payloads are justified by the assignment of ELINT priority one to the [REDACTED] objectives. However, the results of the initial launches should be carefully analyzed with possible consequent recommendation that phase two (location emphasis) then be considered.

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Tab B

COMOR-D-65/2

h. Mission 7209, designed for collection of [redacted] and Soviet LRAF radio telephone represent COMINT priorities which are relatively low. However, the development of a capability to profitably handle signals of these types represents a long range potential of some promise. It is therefore recommended that the package be launched when possible.

i. If TAKI- 3 results fail to satisfy existing requirements for TALL KING location and lobe structure information, additional coverage will be required.

j. The present program does not provide adequate Directed Coverage of the ABM guidance signals. It is estimated that their signals will fall within the [redacted] frequency range, most likely in the S-Band region. Because the ABM guidance signals are likely to be very weak in comparison to the normal S-Band signal environment, special R&D efforts will be required and a [redacted] vehicle such as that scheduled for subsequent [redacted] launches is recommended.  
(Para G above applies)

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1 AUGUST 2015

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Tab B

COMOR-D-65/2

2. Other signals of relatively high priority for Directed Coverage are considered to require R/D of a magnitude such that launches of payloads during the period under question are not feasible. They are therefore not considered for the purpose of this interim guidance.

8

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Tentative Satellite SIGINT Launch Program (March 1963 - March 1964)

Combined Booster and Package			Space Available Package			
Month	Mission No.	Nickname	MCS	Mission No.	Nickname	MCS
March 1963				7214	GRAPE JUICE	66-70
April 1963				[REDACTED]		
May 1963	[REDACTED]	POPPY		7207	WILD BILL	550-620
June 1963	[REDACTED]			7208	PLYMOUTH ROCK	2000-4000 2500-3500
July 1963				[REDACTED]		
August 1963	7210		550 - 610 66 - 72	[REDACTED]		
September 1963	[REDACTED]	POPPY				
October 1963				[REDACTED]		
November 1963	[REDACTED]			[REDACTED]		
December 1963						
January 1964	[REDACTED]			[REDACTED]		
February 1964	[REDACTED]			[REDACTED]		
March 1964	[REDACTED]					

On shelf:

[REDACTED] Five months lead time (no booster allocated)

7209 Being modified. Available after June 1963

New Jersey [REDACTED] 100 - 150 mcs.

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Copy 1	DCI TCO for USIB/S
18, 19	Asst/Ops(NPIC)
20	C/PSD(NPIC)
21	C/PID(NPIC)
22	C/CSD(NPIC)
23	LS/PID(NPIC)
24	TSO CIA
25	DDI TCO
26, 27	OSI TCO(for CIA COMORmember)
28, 29	OSI TCO
30	OCI TCO
31	ORR TCO
32	DDP TCO
33	DDR TCO
34	AD/OSA
35	OD/OSA
36	Intel/OSA
37	SO/OSA
38-41	SA/DDR