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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

January 21, 1971

NOTE FOR DR. NAKA *V*

SUBJECT: SALT Debriefing

As you are aware, you, Dr. Seamans and Dr. McLucas are scheduled to be briefed by General Allison on February 1.

Attached for your information is a record memorandum reflecting the thoughts passed to Colonel Sweeney and the staff on January 19, by Col Paul VonIns and Capt Bill McLean of Gen Allison's staff.

Col Sweeney raised an interesting point during the January 19 debriefing about USIB involvement. I share the notion that USIB should begin generating some interest in the requirements as opposed to the capability for verification. Our systems are capable but no real assessment has been made on the required intensity.

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of verification and the effect of this on our total mix of resources during a year-by-year verification process. This may be a point worthy of mention in your future discussions on SALT.

[REDACTED]  
HAROLD S. COYLE, JR.  
Major, USAF

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1st NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

January 21, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Debriefing on the SALT Negotiations

Colonel VonIns and Capt McLean debriefed the staff on January 20, on the current status of the SALT talks. Colonel VonIns led off the debriefing by explaining the proceedings of SALT I at Helsinki, and SALT II at Vienna. SALT I consisted of the U. S. tabling two kinds of "illustrative" proposals to show what types of an agreement could be made. SALT II ended with the U. S. tabling a definitive proposal, sometimes referred to as "Option E". The proposal, directed by NSDM 74 remains the U. S. position. It is less comprehensive than the proposals prepared earlier under NSSM 28 but did include mention of specific verification of the agreement by "national means."

Capt McLean then explained what had occurred during SALT III at Helsinki, which ended December 18. The U. S. stand during this round was one of "standing fast" on the tabled proposal and to let the Soviets do the talking. Several topics of interest arose during both formal and informal discussions.

1. The Soviets began "piecemealing out" counters to the U. S. proposal but never wrapped this up. Then toward the end of the round the Soviets tabled an "ABM only" proposal which was tabled with blanks for radius permitted and numbers of systems to be positioned around Moscow and Washington. The Soviets apparently are treating their

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proposal as their beginning position and not their final one. This has implications for the decision on the U. S. FY 72 budget for the SAFEGUARD system.

2. There were informal discussions relating to verification by "national means." The formal proposal set forth some points which appear to confirm that the Soviets desire to protect their own satellite capability. OSD legal people feel that there were no traps in the Soviet proposal with regards to a potential dispute over what constitutes national sovereignty. The Soviets have privately discussed their desire to keep the overhead reconnaissance effort viable and it is indicated that they have a sincere desire to retain their capability. There is an implied "understanding" of non-interference with national means as well as an "understanding" of no deliberate concealment which deviates from established practices of construction and building.

Colonel VonIns then went on to discuss the matter of Inter-Agency papers in support of policy decisions affecting the SALT negotiations. He stated that there had been 42 Inter-Agency papers generated by the National Security Council between SALT II and SALT III. Only two or three of these papers ever reached the top decision group. After explaining the mechanism for working these papers Colonel VonIns speculated that the preparation for SALT IV to begin in Vienna on March 15 will be more rational and there will be fewer study requests generated. There are presently four papers under review at this time which are considered meaningful for the negotiations. These are verification of mobile ICBM's, fixed ICBM's, SAM upgraded to ABM capability, and strategic forces survivability. There is still apparently a desire to review and reassess the October 1969 Verification Panel Study. Mr. Kissinger's present feelings are that the four papers mentioned above, especially the strategic forces survivability paper, serve as the reassessment to the original Verification Panel Study. We share the view of JCS that a consolidated review of our verification capabilities directly associated with the tabled proposal should be accomplished.

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In summary there seems to be optimism as to the potential of reaching a fairly extensive Arms Limitation Treaty with the Soviets but the question remains--when will an agreement be reached. No one is willing to speculate on this. Contrary to the reports in the press, the Soviet Party Congress which convenes in March apparently is not expected to have significant impact on the talks. The NRO will continue to support the efforts of General Allison's office as required. It is evident that the NRP is going to be the major element in the process of evaluating adherence to an Arms Limitation agreement.

*[Signature]*  
HAROLD S. COYLE, JR.  
Major, USAF

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