

~~TOP SECRET~~POL-B-1/mjk
HANDLE VIA
BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

15 December 1967

SUBJECT: ISA Disclosure Initiative

On November 29, we received the attached memorandum from Ambassador Kohler, calling for a DOD-initiated meeting of the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee. The memorandum caught us by surprise and the immediate concern was to find out who had called the State Department and what was on his mind.

Ray Garthoff, at State, and Colonel George Overby, ISA, were very cooperative in helping us get the answers. The genesis of this matter lay in a conversation between Mr. McNamara and Mr. McNaughton last July, when Mr. McNamara was reviewing a DIA/JCS memorandum which recommended limited disclosure of "the fact of" satellite reconnaissance and of some reconnaissance products. The Secretary nonconcurred strongly with the DIA/JCS position and indicated so. Then he asked Mr. McNaughton, "Is there perhaps some initiative regarding disclosure which could benefit us? I wonder . . ."

Dr. Morton Halperin (SI/TK) (hired by Adam Yarmolinsky, and newly assigned to ISA) picked up this comment. After several month's mulling over the matter (as well as hearing a complete policy briefing by the NRO Staff), Dr. Halperin called Ray Garthoff and asked for a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee to consider the following U. S. initiative:

The U. S. to negotiate secretly with the Soviets for a joint public disclosure of satellite reconnaissance capability. Halperin feels that this initiative is analogous to the recent ABM discussions. The scenario would be: Approach the Soviets on the question, they refuse to join us, we disclose the discussions to the press, and the world (1) recognizes and applauds the U. S. desire for openness and cooperation and (2) decries Soviet negativism and isolation.

The foregoing resume is based on our conversations with Garthoff and Overby. Other factors enter the picture:

1. Based on his RAND tenure, Halperin is disaffected with the Air Force.
2. He tends to reflect the liberal news of Yarmolinsky on disarmament and disclosure.

HANDLE VIA

BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM~~TOP SECRET~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOO DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLYCONTROL NO _____
COPY _____ OF _____ COPIES
PAGE _____ OF _____ PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA
BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

3. He rarely works on a coordinating basis; he typically acts unilaterally, ignoring ensuing complaints.

4. He is not impressed by the points raised in the NRO Staff briefing on satellite reconnaissance policy.

5. He is extremely provoked over the manner in which we handled the Lindsay episode, calling our modus, "Gestapo tactics."

General Berg and I briefed Dr. Flax on this episode on November 29. He, also, had not heard of the meeting or of the initiative and said he would call Mr. Warnke. We discussed the impact of Halperin's venture and agreed that, if permitted to go to a conference table, it would probably be well-received by ACDA, NASA, NASC, and State. CIA would probably be intimidated by the insinuation that the initiative was Mr. McNamara's idea. The vote looked like 6 to 1, with the NRO in bad taste for splitting with the other OSD member!

On December 1, Dr. Flax called to tell me he had talked to Mr. Warnke, who had not heard of the meeting. Dr. Flax agreed with my suggestion that we "postpone" the meeting. I cancelled it by calling Mr. Gartoff's office.

PAUL E. WORTHMAN
Colonel, USAF

1 Attachment

HANDLE VIA
BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIRECTIVE 520D.1D DOES NOT APPLY

CONTROL NO _____
COPY _____ OF _____ COPIES
PAGE _____ OF _____ PAGES